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Informatics, Politics, and Theory
Over the past two decades a substantial body of critical writing has 
emerged to address the broad transformations that constitute the histori-
cal period named the “society of control” (by Gilles Deleuze) and the era 
of the “cybernetic hypothesis” (by Tiqqun). In strictly economic terms 
this same period could be dened as that of computer-enabled, post-
Fordist, neoliberal capitalism—and it should be noted straight o the bat 
that “computer-enabled,” in the sense I intend it here, does not describe 
simply the rise-to-ubiquity of digital technologies in production but rather 
the broad array of social, economic, political, and cultural changes theo-
rized through cybernetics research in the 1940s and both inspired and 
emblematized by the universal, binary, and discrete functionality of the 
computer. e major terms of this historical turn are by now well dened: 
information replaces material goods as the principle commodity; exible, 
precarious forms of labor play a central role in the employment market-
place; the market, underpinned by informatic systems, regulates all social 
interactions; the notion of the worker as psychologically interior individ-
ual is replaced by that of the mathematically modelable automaton. While 
this present era is in many respects a clear extension of the disciplinary, 
industrial societies predicated on the familiar systems of exchange, circu-
lation, value production, and exploitation examined by Marx in the mid-
nineteenth century, the transformations and novel formations that dene 
it as a distinct historical period require us to reevaluate and adapt our same 
principle modes of critical thought.1 
is essay, which is deeply indebted to the approach set out by Luc 
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Boltanski and Ève Chiapello in e New Spirit of Capitalism and taken 
up by Nancy Fraser in her commanding “Feminism, Capitalism, and the 
Cunning of History,” aims to interrogate certain notions of radical politi-
cal practice and the theoretical models that might be derived from them 
in the context of post-Fordist, neoliberal economics and the ubiquitous 
informatic culture that is tightly bound up with it. In her 2009 article, pub-
lished in the New Le! Review, Fraser uses the term “the cunning of history” 
to describe processes whereby historical change recasts radical practices as 
central to new modes of production and governance (2009, 99). Focusing 
on the changing role of second-wave feminism from the postwar, state-
organized form of capitalism to the “post-Fordist, transnational, neolib-
eral” form that emerged in the late twentieth century, Fraser compellingly 
analyses the “complex, disturbing possibility” that “cultural changes jump-
started by the second wave, salutary in themselves, have served to legiti-
mate a structural transformation of capitalist society that runs directly 
counter to feminist visions of a just society” (99). 
All this is neatly summed up in an excerpt from Fredric Jameson’s 
“Class and Allegory in Contemporary Mass Culture: Dog Day A!ernoon 
as a Political Film,” in which he examines the dialectical situation whereby 
social movements that campaign for an equal and just society are both 
structurally integral to and structurally unrealizable by late capitalism. 
Jameson suggests that
the values of the civil rights movement and the women’s movement and 
the anti-authoritarian egalitarianism of the student’s movement are thus 
preeminently cooptable because they are already-as ideals-inscribed in 
the very ideology of capitalism itself; and we must take into account 
the possibility that these ideals are part of the internal logic of the sys-
tem, which has a fundamental interest in social equality to the degree 
to which it needs to transform as many of its subjects or its citizens into 
identical consumers interchangeable with everybody else. e Marxian 
position—which includes the ideals of the Enlightenment but seeks to 
ground them in a materialist theory of social evolution—argues on the 
contrary that the system is structurally unable to realize such ideals even 
where it has an economic interest in doing so. (1977, 884)
I am interested in mapping the conundrum set out above, about the 
simultaneous co-option of radical ideals and the fundamental impossibil-
ity of realizing the basic goal of these ideals—that is, a “just society”—by 
late capitalism onto the current, informatic stage of the same system. For 
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starters, as we will see, this informatic dimension compels us to supple-
ment Jameson’s “identical consumers” with “identical producers.” Central 
to this argument is the way in which certain practices—ones that might 
seem sound as the basis for apparently radical politics when considered in 
terms of critical logics carried over from the Enlightenment to industrial 
societies—appear disconcertingly isomorphic with the fundamental prin-
ciples of contemporary production when viewed through a lens of infor-
matic critique that aords us a technically (as well as theoretically) specic 
analysis of the conditions of neoliberal, computational culture.
It is straightforward enough to sketch out the ways in which modes of 
critical thinking—from the base of Marx, Freud, and Saussure and their 
descendants through to the multiple theoretical approaches to identity 
politics that have emerged around them—have helped constitute certain 
modes of radical theory and practice throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century. In relation to Marx, to be against the dominant mode of 
production and circulation is to be against a normative, and thus unequal, 
society. In relation to Freud, to transgress norms, be they related to sex, 
violence, or identity, is to be against this same society. And in relation to 
Saussure, to be against monolithic, overarching structures and the reduc-
tion of language to pure utility is to be against this society. Each of these 
formations presents a model of the heroic outsider, the individual who, 
either alone or in a group of similar individuals, campaigns through word 
or deed against cultural, economic, and political injustice. 
is model of individual or group resistance, which is deeply rooted in 
the nineteenth-century opposition between Enlightenment and Romanti-
cism, does not contain any provision for the emergent fact that, accord-
ing to Deleuze, informatic society is characterized by the elimination of 
notions of the individual and the group in favor of the dividual and the data 
bank (Deleuze 1995, 180). e dividual describes the body that is coded 
in terms of discrete movements (as theorized by Philip E. Agre in his 
“Surveillance and Capture” [1994]) or markers of identity (as theorized 
by Lisa Nakamura in her books Cybertypes and Digitizing Race). is dis-
cretization presents a social violence that is composed not of reactionary 
force but of preemptive informatics: techniques of targeting, capture, and 
prediction. As Samuel Weber puts it, “A certain kind of targeting denes 
‘opportunity’ strictly in terms of the present in order to bring the future, 
and with it tuchē [luck, fortune], under control” (2005, 21). Further cast-
ing the Romanticist notion of explicit conict between revolutionary indi-
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viduals or groups and the state into di"culty today is the notion that this 
very model of opposition is cast as a form of productive labor under the 
cybernetically inected principles of game theory (which emerge from 
the work of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in the 1930s and 
1940s and which furnish the all-against-all competition model of neolib-
eral economics), which state that human behavior can be most predictably 
modeled under the assumption of perpetual conict or struggle.
e obvious solution to this, of course, is to locate some equivalent 
theoretical approaches to those set out above in practices that are spe-
cic to digital, rather than industrial, modes of production. Networking, 
hacking, and the virus—three of the most commonly evoked concepts 
of radical politics in relation to digital culture—emerge as prime candi-
dates here. To call on but a few examples, the supposed political force of 
these practices can be witnessed in Ted Nelson and Howard Rheingold’s 
presentation of hypertext and distributed communication technologies as 
drivers of new forms of expression and pedagogy, Critical Art Ensemble’s 
deployment of the hacker as political activist or revolutionary, and Nathan 
Martins’s concept of “viral activism.”2 What this approach of substituting 
one group of practices for another fails to come to terms with, however, 
are the structural changes brought about by the emergence of a computer-
mediated mode of production. All of the practices set out here might pres-
ent modes of action specic to the computer, but they retain a connection 
with the Romanticist notion of the individual or group that is undercut 
by the predominance of the dividual and the data bank characteristic of 
control societies, and that places their viability as a base for eective politi-
cal critique in doubt. Furthermore, by their very status as computational 
practices, networking, hacking, and computer viruses present the very real 
risk of nominally radical or oppositional acts’ actually bolstering the e"-
cacy of the mode of production by providing novel forms of aesthetic and 
experiential labor. 
Before moving onto the virus, which poses the most complex rela-
tionship with informatic culture of the three concepts set out above, it is 
necessary to work through the ways in which networking and hacking, so 
easy to situate as modes of resistance or critique, are explicitly posited by 
the political and economic structures of postindustrial societies as ideal 
models of labor. 
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Networks, Hacking, and Informatic Labor
It might be immediately noted that there is a clear dierence between net-
working and hacking in that the former describes an organizational model 
while the la#er describes a form of delinquency or civil disobedience. 
Viewed in this way it might appear that hacking, as a normatively “nega-
tive” practice, has a closer connection to civil disobedience and the com-
puter virus than it does to the network, but to make this claim is to ignore 
some crucial historical facts about both practices. On the one hand, the 
distributed network form is as historically bound up with insurgency and 
guerrilla warfare as it is with the Internet, a fact that places its unequivocally 
“good” status in relation to contemporary liberal democracy in doubt. On 
the other hand, the term “hacker,” as will shortly be discussed, is central 
to the early practice of computer science in university laboratories in the 
1970s—making it very di"cult to argue for the practice as unequivocally 
“bad” from the perspective of the current world system. If one accepts that 
both practices have su"ciently checkered pasts as to be indistinguish-
able in terms of any innate “goodness” or “badness” it becomes possible 
to identify some substantial points of comparison that can form the basis 
for an analysis that is properly suited to their specic technical character.3
e key characteristics by means of which networks and hacking can 
be compared, and that cast their role as oppositional practices in doubt, 
can be placed into two main categories. First, the network and hacking are 
broadly conceived of as social practices—that is, they are predicated on 
the intervention of human users. e most commonly raised categories 
through which the distributed network is proposed as a politically radical 
form are (1) as a general model of a nonhierarchical structure that does 
away with sovereign individuals and institutions and (2) as a distributed 
communications system that allows groups to exibly and spontaneously 
organize with li#le formal planning. Pu#ing aside for a moment Fried-
rich Ki#ler’s challenge—one that might appear increasingly persuasive 
as this essay develops—that the Internet allows real communication “not 
between people but between machines” (Armitage 2006, 35), this makes 
it clear that the notion of networking as politically progressive rests on the 
novel types of social interaction it aords. In the same way, hacking does 
not describe a general condition of computer use—although as I will esh 
out shortly, it once did—but rather a specic approach based on a “love” 
of experimenting with technology. e hacker Dr. K denes the practice 
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as follows in the introduction to his collection of anonymous testimoni-
als titled Hackers’ Tales: “A hacker is motivated by a love of technology; a 
desire to learn, play and master the technology for its own sake, because it’s 
fun. It’s this playful desire, coupled with an intense curiosity, which leads 
the hacker on” (2004, 15). To put it another way, neither hacking nor net-
working can be necessarily dened through their outputs. Computer hard-
ware will function in the same way whether it has been accessed through 
a so$ware interface, elegant formalized programming, or an experimental, 
hacked-together approach. Equally, the appearance of a webpage is subject 
to the same technical standards whether it has been composed by a single 
individual or by a distributed group. 
e dierence that exists in the processes described above is not tech-
nical, located in the forms that are created by a given practice, but social, 
located in the way in which a form or object is produced through a given 
practice. is is a condition that we can trace back to one of the earliest 
developments toward the present informatic society, Claude Shannon’s 
Mathematical eory of Communication of 1948. Shannon, making a case 
for the kind of statistically oriented approach to formerly human-centered 
aairs that is characteristic of today’s neoliberal economics, states:
Frequently the messages have meaning; that is, they refer to or are cor-
related according to some system with certain physical or conceptual 
entities. ese semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the 
engineering problem. e signicant aspect is that the actual message 
is one selected from a set of possible messages. e system must be 
designed to operate for each possible selection, not just the one that will 
actually be chosen since this is unknown at the time of design. (1949, 3)
Shannon’s mathematical theory foregrounds a problem that any 
critical theory of informatic culture must come to terms with: one of the 
principle impulses of post-Fordism functions to recast the social as an 
engineering concern. Clearly this is an ideological function rather than a 
material one, in that human thought and communication does not become 
more mechanistic but rather is presented as such—with cybernetic, cog-
nitive-psychological, and neuroscientic approaches at the forefront. Nev-
ertheless, a principle task of theoretical and practical critique must be to 
locate ways in which this computational ideology can be disrupted. e 
intent of a practitioner or the cultural delineation of a particular practice, 
be it utopian (as in the case of the network) or radical (as in the case of 
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hacking), must be mediated through the technical systems that undergird 
this practice—the digital computer that provides both the inspiration and 
the means for today’s indierent, statistically modelable approach to the 
human that any workable critical theory must seek to analyze in terms of 
its contradictions and shortfalls. 
e second characteristic linking networking and hacking is that 
both can be easily traced through empirical history to normatively “good” 
notions. Even taking into account the association with guerrilla tactics 
raised above, the notion of the nonhierarchical, utopian space of the net-
work recurs here. e normative “goodness” of hacking may appear more 
problematic in light of its recent portrayal as the preserve of terrorists and 
cybercriminals, but etymologically the term relates to the maximization of 
limited ability or formal training through perseverance and experimenta-
tion. We should remember the above-cited fact that many early computer 
scientists self-identied as hackers.4 ese two historical meanings of the 
noun “hacker,” both of which are clearly distinct from the criminalized 
notion in wide use today, are set out by the “white hat” hacker and cyber-
security expert Robert Graham in his “Hacking Lexicon” (2000):
e word “hacker” started out in the 14th century to mean somebody 
who was inexperienced or unskilled at a particular activity (such as 
golf). In the 1970s, the word “hacker” was used by computer enthusi-
asts to refer to themselves. is reected the way enthusiasts approach 
computers: they eschew formal education and play around with the 
computer until they can get it to work. . . . In much the same way, a golf 
hacker keeps hacking at the golf ball until they get it in the hole.
e practice that is suggested by the combination of these two aspects 
of networking and hacking—that is, exible, nonhierarchical work facili-
tated by networked computers and proceeding through an experimental 
or playful approach—presents us with the seemingly paradoxical situa-
tion brought about by the centrality of play to contemporary work, a key 
aspect of the novel forms of value creation that characterize informatic 
capitalism. So both the network and hacking are social acts that are rooted 
in notions of coherent distributed organization and an experimental or 
playful approach to problem solving. Viewed in this way, they cannot be 
reasonably considered as the basis for radical theory or practice; rather, 
both present models of organization and labor that are idealized under the 
conditions of postindustrial, neoliberal economics. 
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e very concept of play as labor presents us with an unavoidable 
notion in the critical analysis of informatic culture; that the digital tech-
nologies underpinning both work and play are, as Bernard Stiegler argues 
by borrowing a term from Jacques Derrida, pharmacological. ey are at 
once poison and cure, allowing as much as they restrict. e analysis of 
networking and hacking set out above suggests that there is a layer model 
that can be applied to the pharmacological character of digital technolo-
gies; the freedoms they enable are conned to the social layer, to the intent 
of their practitioners, while the restrictions function at the layer of tech-
nical processes. is is also one of the key ways in which spectacle still 
performs an important role in the control society, with apparent freedoms 
conned to the ever-more-aestheticized graphical interface level while 
restrictions function at the deep structural level. Networking and hack-
ing may present a platform for radical politics at the social level, but at the 
technical and infrastructural level they are emblematic of the newest forms 
of exploitation and restriction. Any critical theory of informatic culture 
must come to terms with this dual function of technology. 
Viruses, Automation, and Identity
Networking and hacking appear to be practices that are opposed but in 
some way progressive; however, they are in fact closely linked through a 
common dimension that makes them unworkable as the basis for a the-
oretical critique. What, then, of the virus? When compared to the dis-
tributed network and hacking, the virus might appear to escape a close 
connection to idealized labor practices because it exhibits a more com-
plex relationship with the social than those two practices, while suggesting 
a more fundamentally malicious functionality. It is also the only one of 
the three forms that Gilles Deleuze proposes as a “threat” to informatic 
control in his 1990 essay “Postscript on Control Societies,” in which he 
draws the analogy between the virus and sabotage in the preceding era 
of thermodynamic, industrial labor (Deleuze 1990, 180). Despite all this, 
however, the virus posits some of the most signicant challenges when it 
comes to thinking through the possibility of radical theory and practice 
within computation. It should be noted up front, however, that the obvi-
ous political questions surrounding the relationship between virality and 
post-Fordist capitalism, those concerning the role of viral marketing and 
viral networked content, are not of any great interest in this essay. As dis-
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cussed above, the social uses of technology, while undoubtedly of great 
import, do li#le to get at the underlying political formation of informatic 
societies—that is, the computer technologies that either facilitate or set 
the inputs and outputs of both labor and leisure practices. Viral content, 
be it an advertisement or some noncommercial piece of content, is a phe-
nomenon of human users, not of technical systems—and it is these tech-
nical systems, because of the way in which they dene power relations in 
control societies while at the same time deecting critical analysis, that are 
our concern here. 
To be clear, I do not suggest that the technical and the social are inde-
pendent categories—that computers and networks somehow emerged 
outside human practices. Rather, I am concerned with the historical pro-
cess whereby post-Fordism is premised on a cybernetic logic that seeks to 
do away with the social as such in favor of gridded, predicable mathemati-
cal models of complex systems and, as such, conne my analysis to the 
ways in which this logic might be responded to critically. e hypothetical 
example of a viral video that, while fullling a normatively good objective 
of spreading awareness of political or economic injustice, contributes to 
the data mine and thus the bo#om line of a company such as Google or 
Facebook partly encapsulates the dilemma presented here. As the discus-
sions of networking and hacking set out above demonstrate, in an era in 
FIG. 1: Virus transfer in a time-sharing system. Source: Frederick Cohen, A Short Course 
in Computer Viruses (New York: Wiley, 1994).
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which computation represents the material base of the mode of produc-
tion, subjecting even the classical labor practices of agrarian and industrial 
work to the global feedback loops of a system-dynamic logic, the role of 
any technique that is practiced through computation requires a nuanced 
critical analysis that addresses the formal as political. 
Despite the overwhelming associations with criminality and terror-
ism that are constantly a#ached to the notion of the computer virus there 
is nothing intrinsic to its technical denition that suggests the types of 
disruptive applications that might enable it to be posited as the basis of 
a resistant or oppositional politics. According to Frederick Cohen, a pio-
neer in the study of computer viruses, a virus need be dened no more 
complexly than as “a program that can ‘infect’ other programs by modify-
ing them to include a, possibly evolved, version of itself ” (1994, 2). It is 
specically this characteristic that gives the computer virus its biologically 
oriented name. A condition of a computer virus’s eectiveness is that it 
exists within, without necessarily impairing the functionality of, the code 
of the host program. Viruses are not, as Cohen notes, necessarily harmful 
or dangerous but simply describe programs that reproduce automatically, 
a#aching within a host program, as a biological virus a#aches itself within 
a host cell. If we are to accept this fundamental technical denition as pri-
mary—and in the light of the overwhelmingly technical base upon which 
computer-driven, post-Fordist production is premised such an approach 
appears essential—the virus is, at best, a politically neutral form. 
If, as Cohen suggests, the technical function of the virus is absolutely 
neutral when it comes to its constructive or destructive potential, there 
nonetheless exists a substantial gap between this technical description 
and its cultural framing. e contrast between Cohen’s view of viruses 
as specically technical entities, carrying no automatic association with 
harm or damage, and the ones provided on the website of the Microso$ 
Corporation is telling in terms of the construction of viruses in relation to 
networked control:
Computer viruses are small so$ware programs that are designed to 
spread from one computer to another and to interfere with computer 
operation. 
A virus might corrupt or delete data on your computer, use your 
e-mail program to spread itself to other computers, or even erase every-
thing on your hard disk. 
Viruses can be disguised as a#achments of funny images, greeting 
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cards, or audio and video les.
Viruses also spread through downloads on the Internet. ey can be 
hidden in illicit so$ware or other les or programs you might download. 
(Microso$, n.d.; emphasis added)
is conguration of the virus as inherently disruptive, corrupting, 
and deceptive makes it quite clear how a certain conceptualization of such 
an object could nd itself posited as a politically radical form. is depic-
tion, however, has li#le to do with the technical form of the computer 
virus, which is computational and thus both formal and indierent. As 
Jussi Parikka notes, “Viruses do not merely represent an example of mali-
cious viral code but are part of a cultural-historical assemblage of digital 
culture. . . . e virus is not . . . a random pa#ern without sense but a certain 
rationality” (2007, 285–86). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri go so far 
as to suggest that the technical function of the computer virus is in fact 
isomorphic with the function of empire, stating, “Empire’s institutional 
structure is like a so$ware program that carries a virus along with it, so that 
it is continually modulating and corrupting the institutional forms around 
it” (2000, 197–98). So on the one hand (according to Microso$), com-
puter viruses are denitively disruptive, corrupting, and deceptive, while 
on the other (according to Hardt and Negri) they are isomorphic with the 
function of distributed sovereignty of which Microso$ is an economic and 
technological exemplar. e disparity that exists between these cultural 
congurations of computer viruses appears to suggest that they are so neu-
tral as to be untenable as a political form. Furthermore, it is precisely this 
formal neutrality that restates the technical (if not the practical) status of 
viruses as an entirely separate dimension to their cultural or social appear-
ance. As is demonstrated above in terms of the network and hacking, it 
is the universal and formalizing nature of the computer, in conjunction 
with its role at the core of contemporary production, that makes it highly 
problematic to claim computational practices, whatever the human intent 
behind them, as a model for progressive or radical theory and politics. e 
virus, if we are to accept only the basic technical denition of a program 
that replicates itself automatically, describes li#le more than the idealized 
function of computation itself, that is, a system of organization that func-
tions automatically.5 
Extending from this there is a more troubling set of concerns that 
surround the notion of the virus as radical political form, and that point 
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toward specic historical problems around critique and identity politics 
in the age of ubiquitous computation. Although it takes its metaphorical 
name from the function of biological viruses, the automatic function of 
the computer virus in fact owes itself to the automatic function of its base 
technology, the computer. If we look back to the roots of computation, the 
principle mode of production in postindustrial societies, we immediately 
come up against the fundamental problem in the conceptualization of the 
computer virus as politically radical form. Alan Turing, in a seminal 1950 
paper on computing machines, states that “it is the duty of the [control 
unit in a computer] to see that . .  . instructions are obeyed correctly and 
in the right order. e control is so constructed that this necessarily hap-
pens” (437). 
Consider this automatic or necessary functionality in terms of some 
classical political categories: social class that functions automatically, sex 
and gender that function automatically, race that functions automatically, 
identity that functions automatically. Making these notions a reality is the 
dream of informatic neoliberalism. is is why we need to proceed care-
fully when claiming this or that cultural practice as politically radical under 
the material conditions of contemporary culture. To present the overall 
function of the computer virus as a model for contemporary critique is to 
place automation at the heart of progressive thought in a way that is deeply 
troubling, for the automatic, in the context of informatic culture, presents 
us with an equivalent to the notion of the natural or, to align ourselves 
more clearly with the critical projects of the late twentieth century, essen-
tial in relation to prior systems of inequality and domination. For natural 
or essential identity today we must substitute statistical identity. e fun-
damental power of critique lies in its activity; it is a process of unearthing 
contradictions and inequalities that stands in opposition to the automatic 
form of reading that characterizes ideology. Holding up automation as 
a component of radical politics thus risks returning thought around the 
politics of identity to a time before Marx and Freud, de Beauvoir, Butler, 
Said, Bhabha, Spivak, and those who followed them—or perhaps more 
accurately placing it in an alternate version of reality in which this work is 
irrelevant—at a point in history where, as Deleuze has noted, the individ-
ual and the group are replaced, in the technics and terminology of domina-
tion, by dividuals and data sets.
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Noise, Addition, Boredom
It is quite clear that one cannot take the overall function of computer 
viruses as a model for radical politics or critique because (1) it brings with 
it no essential functionality that critiques or problematizes computation 
and (2) a large part of its functionality is no more than a basic condition 
of computing applied to the reproduction of a program, creating a number 
of deeply unpalatable outcomes around the notion of automatic identity 
when applied as a model of critical thought. ere is, however, one ele-
ment of the computer virus that we have yet to examine—an element that 
is neither a simple social relation nor a simple corollary of computation 
itself. Viruses are not transformative but additive. e code of the com-
puter program, or the organism in the instance of a biological virus, does 
not immediately begin to function in an opposite, disordered, or entropic 
way when a virus a#aches within it, but in the same way with new infor-
mation, be it a machine code, DNA, or RNA, added to it. e information 
previously contained within the host program is not turned into a qualita-
tively dierent entity but rather an excessive version of itself, distinguished 
at the level of code, but not at the level of program functionality or graphi-
cal output, through the addition or subtraction of data. When an infected 
program runs, more o$en than not it runs in its original form perfectly, 
with the distinction being that a separate process or set of processes runs 
at the same time. is additive distortion, which we can dene as a quality 
of the computer virus that relies on automation to propagate but that does 
not in itself constitute automatism, oers us a route through the problem 
of politics and cultural theory presented by computer viruses. 
is conceptual thicket can be claried by working through the 
same principle of addition in relation to the closely related formation of 
noise, the “passive” danger to control societies that Deleuze describes as 
corresponding to the “active” danger of viruses (1990, 180). Since Shan-
non’s Mathematical eory of Communication and the multiple, cross-dis-
ciplinary contributions of cybernetics, noise principally appears to us as 
a statistically modelable component of communication, something that 
is “programmable and hence a mode of algorithmic rationality” (Parikka 
2007, 286). While this may hold true for a certain concept of noise that is 
conceptually remediated (as it is in Shannon) from a material product of 
electrical or electronic devices to a statistical component of a symbolic-
logical communication theory, it does not change the fact that noise 
Virality, Informatics, and Critique 165
describes those components of computation that exist in an unmeasur-
able or in-between state and thus cannot be adequately captured, coded, 
and cast into algorithms or grammars of action. In this conceptualization 
the computer virus is an example of executed noise, in that it adds new ele-
ments in a way that is not registered as a qualitative dierence in the host 
program by any component of computer hardware. A virus a#ached to a 
cracked copy of Adobe Photoshop does not necessarily result in that copy 
of Photoshop running any dierently from the “o"cial” version; the virus 
is simply some extra code that will run in some way completely unrelated 
to the host program. As such, those lines of code that constitute the virus 
can be said to be an addition to the host program that is at once both quan-
titatively positive and unmeasurable. It is this aspect of the virus—the pos-
itive expression of unmeasurability—that can be productively extracted 
to serve as a model for radical theory and politics under cybernetic post-
Fordism, as expressed in the work of Tiqqun and others.
In “e Cybernetic Hypothesis” Tiqqun set out the possibility 
expressed by additive practices that escape capture and coding as the prin-
ciple form of executed unmeasurability within informatic systems:
For a cybernetician, any disorder can only come from there having been 
a discrepancy between the pre-set behaviors and the real behaviors of 
the system’s elements. A behavior that escapes control while remaining 
indierent to the system is called “noise,” which consequently cannot be 
handled by a binary machine, reduced to a 0 or a 1. Such noises are the 
lines of ight, the wanderings of desires that have still not gone back into 
the valorization circuit, the nonenrolled. (2001, 71)
is introduces us to a fascinatingly counterintuitive principle in the 
theorization of informatic culture: in cybernetic societies noise is silence. 
Silence, in the era of informatic capitalism, is that which cannot be mea-
sured, and therefore cannot be captured, coded, transcoded, formalized, 
or pa#erned. It is notable that the 0 (or “low” signal) that makes up one 
half of all binary states in computation corresponds to not 0 volts but 
around 0.7 volts, because no physical logic gate can register a true 0 volt 
signal. e 1 (or “high” signal) corresponds to 2–5 volts. In such a system, 
any signal between 0.8 and 2 volts prevents the gate from registering either 
the 0 or that 1, of which both are crucial to the technical function of com-
putation. is technical model of the positive yet unmeasurable or “silent” 
state is crucial to radical politics today. It produces noise at the fundamen-
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tal level of computability (which in this sense includes practices of infor-
matic capture, denition, automation, modeling, and grammatization) in 
the same way that missing information in the compressed sound, image, or 
video le introduces noise to its user-readable output. It is this noise that 
can serve as the expression of those identities or aspects of identities that 
cannot be cast within predened, normalized categories or grammars of 
action under post-Fordism.
Crucial to this model for radical theory and politics in the era of infor-
matic political economy will be a set of procedures that are premised not 
on a#acking or exceeding informatic society but on executing dierence 
in unmeasurable and thus uncodable ways (in the historical framework 
deployed by Jameson and Fraser we would call these “unco-optable”), 
ways that cannot be computationally dened and thus cast into algo-
rithms, grammars of action, or new modes of production. Several descrip-
tions of such a practice can be found over the past twenty years, from 
Deleuze’s assertion of the need for “vacuoles of noncommunication” that 
do not confront but “evade” (1990, 175) to Tiqqun’s call for a politics that 
“comes from desires that exceed the ux insofar as the ux nourishes them 
without their being trackable therein, where desires pass beneath the track-
ing radar, and occasionally establish themselves” (2001, 72) and Alexan-
der R. Galloway and Eugene acker’s active promotion of “nonexistence” 
in the form of “nonexistent action,” “unmeasurable or not-yet-measurable 
human traits,” and “the promotion of measurable data of negligible impor-
tance” (2007, 135–37). Among other things, what these examples suggest 
is that radical theory and practice within the era of informatic or cyber-
netic capitalism will be boring, in the sense that it will provide us with 
none of the visible or audible material that we are accustomed to from 
prior radical practices and that allow such practices to be valorized as new 
forms of production. is, perhaps above all other historical impositions, 
poses the biggest challenge to the theorist or practitioner hanging on to 
the spectacular radical forms of the past, from the Romantic sublime to 
Bakhtin’s carnivalesque, surrealism, and the various avant-gardes of the 
mid-twentieth century and therea$er—each of which, in the end, is based 
in the contestation, through sabotage and entropic excess, of the dominant 
modes of representation for a given era. 
In the conclusion to Gender Trouble Butler asks a question that remains 
essential to those asked in this essay. Situated in the midst of an analysis of 
the way in which a multiplicity of subject positions becomes potentially 
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unrepresentable, Butler’s key question is italicized below: 
e theories of feminist identity that elaborate predicates of color, 
sexuality, ethnicity, class, and able-bodiedness invariably close with an 
embarrassed “etc.” at the end of the list. rough this horizontal trajec-
tory of adjectives, these positions strive to encompass a situated subject, 
but invariably fail to be complete. is failure, however, is instructive: 
what political impetus is to be derived #om the exasperated “etc.” that so 
o!en occurs at the end of such lines? is is a sign of exhaustion as well as 
of the illimitable process of signication itself. It is the supplement, the 
excess that necessarily accompanies any eort to posit identity once and 
for all. (1990, 143)
Now imagine for a moment that the “etc.” in Butler’s analysis, and the ques-
tion that it prompts, result not from too many, or even innite, subject 
positions—for today this is brutally synonymous with too many, or even 
innite, target demographics, sources of valorizable activity, monetizable 
practices, and so on—but from the impossibility of identifying and declar-
ing positions to dene (and that can thus be exploited to produce value) in 
the rst place. e crucial binary opposition enacted by dominant culture 
thus becomes that between measurable and unmeasurable. is essential 
modication of Butler’s theory, which reformulates its key concerns to 
respond to informatic rather than thermodynamic societies, foregrounds 
the key terms for today’s radical theory and practice. In contrast to all of 
the oppositional forms set out above, tomorrow’s radical practice—which 
is always sadly doomed to be a computational practice according to the 
denition of computation dreamed of by cyberneticians and neoliberal 
ideologists alike and set out at the start of this essay—will be based not 
on contesting or even exceeding representation but rather on escaping it.
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Notes
 1. For all the discussion of information technology, computers, and codes 
that it contains, Deleuze’s “Postscript on Control Societies” is perhaps most 
notable for the conceptual proximity that it presents between control and 
post-Fordist, neoliberal capitalism. roughout the piece Deleuze talks of 
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wages brought into “a state of constant metastability punctuated by ludicrous 
challenges, competitions and seminars,” “an inexorable rivalry presented as 
healthy competition” (1995, 179) and a form of capitalism that seeks to sell 
“services” and buy “activities” (181). It is this political-economic depiction 
of control, for which the computer serves as a model as much as a means of 
control in itself, that informs the present essay. 
 2. It should be acknowledged that while the members of Critical Art Ensemble 
celebrate the practical techniques of hacking as revolutionary in an age of 
ubiquitous digital information systems, they are less optimistic about the 
actual (call them old-fashioned) political sensibilities of hackers: “Teen hack-
ers work out of their parents’ homes and college dormitories to breach cor-
porate and governmental security systems. eir intentions are vague. Some 
seem to know that their actions are political in nature. As Dr. Crash has said: 
‘Whether you know it or not, if you are a hacker you are a revolutionary.’ 
e question is, a revolutionary for what cause? A$er poring through issues 
of Phrack and surng the Internet, one can nd no cause mentioned other 
than the rst step: free access to information. How this information would be 
applied is never discussed. e problem of le#ing children act as the avant-
garde of activism is that they have not yet developed a critical sensibility 
that would guide them beyond their rst political encounter” (Critical Art 
Ensemble 1996, 15). 
 3. For more on the notions of “good” and “bad” in relation to viruses, see 
Parikka and Sampson 2009.
 4. For an idea of the close proximity of the term “hacker” with “o"cial,” o$en 
university-a"liated programmers in the 1970s and early 1980s, see Williams 
2002, especially chapters 1 and 2 and appendix B. As Williams writes, “It 
is a testament to the original computer hackers’ prodigious skill that later 
programmers, including Richard M. Stallman, aspired to wear the same 
hacker mantle. By the mid to late 1970s, the term ‘hacker’ had acquired elite 
connotations. In a general sense, a computer hacker was any person who 
wrote so$ware code for the sake of writing so$ware code. In the particular 
sense, however, it was a testament to programming skill. Like the term ‘art-
ist,’ the meaning carried tribal overtones. To describe a fellow programmer 
as hacker was a sign of respect. To describe oneself as a hacker was a sign 
of immense personal condence. Either way, the original looseness of the 
computer-hacker appellation diminished as computers became more com-
mon” (appendix B). 
 5. For more on this, see Parikka 2007, 207–15.
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